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THE USE OF DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE SEVERITY
OF PUNISHMENT FOR INCARCERATED OFFENDERS
JOSEPH E. SCOTT*
Many studies have been conducted on the de-
cision-making processes of social control agencies.
These studies have provided considerable insight
into both the legal and non-legal factors which
affect people who come into contact with repre-
sentatives of such agencies. While substantial re-
search has already been conducted concerning the
discretionary practices of police, prosecutors,
judges and juries and the effect of their practices
on the legal norm-violator's contact with the law,
there is one area in the criminal justice system
which has been almost totally neglected. Few
studies have investigated the processes which
determine when, how, and why norm-violators who
have been found guilty and incarcerated should be
released from our penal institutions.' This situa-
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American Sociological Society's Annual meetings in
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Institute of Mental Health Grant 1 F01 MH49071-01.
The author wishes to express appreciation to Professors
Simon Dinitz, Karl Schuessler and Austin Turk for
their helpful criticisms on an earlier draft.
'There have been a few studies conducted on the
operation of parole boards, but these have been pri-
marily ethnographic in nature. See, e.g., R. DAWSON,
SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH AND
CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 222-424 (1969); Dawson,
The Decision to Grant or Deny Parole: A Study of Parole
Criteria in Law and Practice, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 243
(1966); Gottesman & Hecker, Parole: A Critique of Its
Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.L. REv. 702
(1963); Quinn, The Parole Board's Duties of Self-
Regulation, 6 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 131 (1972);
Richardson, Parole and the Law, 2 CRM AND DELIN-
QuENCy 27 (1956); Thomas, An Analysis of Parole
Selection, 9 CRTE AN DELINQUENCY 173 (1963);
Comment, The Parole System in Canada, 15 CAN. J.
CraM. & CoRR. 144 (1972); Address by Ramsey Clark,
The Report of the New York Task Force on Parole,
American Society of Criminology annual meeting in
New York, 1973.
Other studies have outlined parole rules used by
various states. See. e.g., Arluke, A Summary of Parole
Rules-Thirteen Years Later, 15 CRIM AND DELiN-
QuENCY 267 (1969); Gottfredson, Ballard, & O'Leary,
Uniform Parole Reports: A Feasibility Study, 3 J. REs.
CRME & DELINQUENCY 104 (1966).
Still other studies have attempted to compare differ-
ences between parole boards with regards to parole
decisions. These have been much more quantitative
tion exists despite the fact that the decision-making
at this stage is not generally governed by "due
process," subject to appeal, nor open to public
scrutiny.
Today, in most states, the determination of the
nature and the extent of an offender's sentence
has become a divided task. A portion of the task
is still assumed by the legislature when it sets
maximum and minimum limits to the sentence
which a court may impose for each offense. 2 The
courts, in turn, perform their judicial function on
a case by case basis. The parole board is in a posi-
tion to exercise still further discretion. The extent
of the parole board's discretion varies greatly
from one jurisdiction to another.3 The discretionary
power of parole boards, however, has apparently
increased concomitantly with the apparent shift
in the ideology of the criminal justice system from
an almost exclusively "retributive" basis to a more
"retributive-reformative" approach. This change
in ideology has resulted in more frequent use of
the indefinite or indeterminate type of sentence.
The increased usage of this type of sentence by
the various states has transferred the primary
responsibility of determining the proper length of
incarceration for each defendant from the judiciary
to the parole board. By simply imposing the statu-
tory sentence passed by the legislature for the
specific offense for which the defendant was found
guilty, the judiciary, in many states, has left
any reconciliation of the seriousness of the
studies. See, e.g., Gottfredson and Wilkins, Parole
Decision Making-A Progress Report, NAT. CRIM.
JUsTIcE EERENCE SERVICE (1973); Gottfredson,
Differences in Parole Decisions Associated with Decision
Makers, 3 J. REs. Cam & DELINQUENCY 114 (1966);
Hoffman, Paroling Policy Feedback, 9 J. REs. CRIME &
DELNQUweNY 117 (1972).
2 For an excellent analysis of the use of differing
sentencing procedures, see, e.g., Vasoli, Growth and
Consequences of Judicial Discretion in Sentencing, 40
NoRE DAME LAWYER 404 (1965); Note, Statutory
Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 CoLrm.
L. REv. 1134 (1960).
For a summary of the statute and practices of the
parole agencies in the fifty states and federal parole,
see Parker, Origins, Development, Current Practices and
Statutes, NAT'L TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
(1972).
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crime with the severity of the sentence entirely to
the discretion of the parole board. Not only does
the parole board have the responsiblity of deter-
mining the proper length of incarceration for each
offender who is given an indefinite sentence, but,
in addition, many parole boards also function as
the state clemency commission. In this capacity,
they have the prerogative to overrule legislatively
enacted minimum sentences, or judicially imposed
minimum or definite sentences, and release inmates
when they feel the inmates should be released.
Because it is one of the later stages in the crim-
inal justice system and perhaps because of the
correctional ideology that release from prison
before the maximum portion of the sentence has
been served "is a privilege rather than a right," 4
the decision-making process releasing inmates from
prison has received little attention from criminolo-
gists. However, with the increasing concern for
"due process," and with the curtailment and con-
trol of arbitrary use of power in administering
justice, the correctional process, and, in particular,
the paroling process, become likely candidates for
scrutiny at this time.5
Despite the numerous constitutional procedural
safeguards applicable at the pre-adjudicative
decision-making stages, the need for still greater
control over the discretion utilized by these social
control agents is seldom denied. Lacking even such
procedural safeguards in the post-adjudicative
process, the innumerable parole board decisions
made on the basis of administrative policy have
not only lacked judicial safeguards, but have, in
addition, not been subject to public scrutiny.
The specific focus of this study is on the criteria
utilized by parole boards in determining the proper
amount of punishment a convicted adult felony
offender should receive. Specific attention is di-
rected to three principal factors: (1) legal, (2)
institutional and (3) personal-biographical. 6 These
three factors were selected because of their rela-
tionship to correctional ideology and criminological
4 For a review of the theoretical foundation of parole,
see D. DRxssER, PRACTICE AND TIEORY OF PROBA-
TION AND PAROxE (2d ed. 1967); Comment, The Parole
System, 120 U. PA. L. Rxv. 282 (1971).
5 This is so despite the decision in Scarpa v. United
States Board of Parole, 468 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1973).
Here, the court held that the actual bestowal or denial
of parole need not be accompanied by a hearing, and
any change in procedures must be made by the legisla-
tive branch, not the judicial.
6 These three factors are similar to those examined
in Green, Sentencing Practices of Criminal Court
Judges, 22 AM. J. CORR. 32 (1966).
theory. The legal factor is the primary considera-
tion in determining the punishment, according to
the retributive school of thought. The severity of
punishment is to be determined by the seriousness
of the crime. The institutional approach (factor)
is closely associated with the reformative approach
to corrections, which advocates the incarceration
of individuals only until they are rehabilitated.
Perhaps the most commonly used indicator of an
individual's rehabilitation while incarcerated is
his institutional behavior. Finally, the personal-
biographical factor is closely associated with the
conflict, or power, theory of criminology. This
theory maintains that those individuals with more
power in society will receive more consideration
and more favorable treatment by representatives
of our legal institutions.
THE METHOD
The data for this study were gathered at three
adult penal institutions for felony offenders located
in the same midwestern state. The principal source
of this data was information recorded in prison
records, compiled and submitted to the parole
boards before each inmate's parole hearing. These
records provide the parole board members with
their only information, on the basis of which they
must decide whether the inmate is to be released
The research sample was comprised of the records
of all female inmates released from the one Mid-
western state's women's prison in 1968 (N = 34),
and a 25 per cent random sample of the records of
all male inmates released from that same Mid-
western state's adult felony penal institutions for
males during 1968 (N = 325).8 The above three
mentioned institutions comprise the total prison
system of this particular Midwestern state. In
addition to the prison records, field observations
were also conducted at each of the institutions
over a six month period.
Correlation and multiple regression analysis
were used to analyze the data. Contingency tables
were also constructed to examine the relationship
between each independent variable and the de-
pendent variable, but are not reported here inas-
much as neither the direction of the zero order
The parole boards which were studied did not talk
to the inmate or to anyone representing him until the
decision concerning parole had been made.
8 The records from 1968 were used even though the
study was carried out during the 1971-1972 school year.
This was done to facilitate a follow-up study and for
other comparative reasons. The observations were
conducted during the summer and fall of 1971.
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relationships nor their strengths is affected sig-
nificantly, whether utilizing statistics based on
categorized data (i.e., Tau b or Gamma), or inter-
val, data (i.e., Pearson's r). By utilizing regression
analysis, it also was possible to control for numer-
ous variables simultaneously without violating any
basic assumptions of the data. 9 Pearson correlation
coefficients provide an indication of the linearity
of each independent variable's relationship to the
dependent variable. By using multiple regression
analysis, the effect of variations within each inde-
pendent variable upon the dependent variable is
provided (unstandardized b or partial regression
coefficient), as is the importance of various inde-
pendent variables' ability to explain variation in
the dependent variable when controlling for all
other independent variables (Standardized 3 or
Beta). In addition, by using this type of analysis,
one can examine variables categorized as legal,
institutional, or social-biographical as sets, and
thereby determine the relationship of each set to
the glependent variable.' 0
The variables examined for their possible effect
upon variations in the severity of punishment
comprise, as mentioned, three factors:
-Legal Factor: the seriousness of the crime (the
legal minimum sentence, in months, imposed by
.the courts);" and the prior criminal involvement
of each inmate (prior criminal involvement was
quantified by weighting prior prison incarcera-
tions, felony and misdemeanor arrests and con-
victions) 12
9 Although many of the independent variables are
nominal, by using dummy variables they are treated as
interval for regression analysis. See, e.g., Suits, Use
of Dummy Variables in Regression Equations, 52 J. Am.
STATISTICAL Ass'N. 548 (1957).
10 See, e.g., Cohen, Prognostic Factors in Functional
Psychosis: A Study in Multivariate Methodology, 30
TRANSACTIONS OF E N.Y. AcAnEzis OF Sci. 833
(1968); Cohen, Multiple Regression as a General Data-
Analytic System, 70 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 426 (1968).
" For those inmates originally given a death sen-
tence, which was subsequently reduced to life, and for
those given life sentences, a score of 500 was assigned.
This was determined in a somewhat arbitrary manner.
12 Each inmate's prior criminal record was ascer-
tained' from the F.B.I. report. From these reports,
five separate indicators of prior criminal involvement
were recorded:
a., Total number of previous misdemeanor arrests
b. Total number of previous felony arrests
c. Total number of previous misdemeanor convic-
tions
d. Total number of previous felony convictions
e. Total number of previous prison incarcerations
These five indicators were combined to form a prior
criminal involvement scale in the following manner:
First, the total number of misdemeanor arrests and the
Institutional Factor: disciplinary reports (the
number received while incarcerated), and institu-
tional adjustment (composed of nine separate
total number of felony arrests in the United States for
1968 were ascertained, as were the number of mis-
demeanor and felony convictions. These nutmbers were
then divided by the United States population as of
July 1, 1968 to get the percentage of, the population
arrested and/or convicted of misdemeanors and/or
felonies during this period. The same procedure was
followed for individuals sentenced to prison during
1968-the total number was divided by the United
States population. The respective percentages were as
follows:
a. 0.04% of the population received by prisons in
1968
b. 0.49% of the population convicted of a felony in
1968
c. 1.41% of the population arrested for a felony in
1968
d. 1.49% of the population convicted of a misde-
meanor in 1968
e. 2.58% of the population arrested for a misde-
meanor in 1968
The percentage of the population received by prisons
in 1968 was approximately fifty times smaller than the
percentage of the population arrested for misdemeanors,
thirty times smaller than the percentage convicted of a
misdemeanor or arrested for a felony, and ten times
smaller than the percentage convicted of a felony.
Therefore, the respective weights of 50, 30, 30, 10, and
I (corresponding to a, b, c, d and e above) were used
to calculate each inmate's prior criminal involvement
score. This score was computed for each individual by
weighting each time he or she had been arrested, con-
victed, or incarcerated in prison by the above weights
and summing the total for each individual.
Although the weights utilized in constructing this
prior criminal involvement scale were derived in a
somewhat crude, albeit nonarbitrary manner, the prior
criminal involvement scale was calculated in a number
of other ways in an attempt to ascertain the effect of
weighting indicators differently. A second scale was
constructed by squaring each of the weights used in the
first scale. The weights 2,500, 900, 900, 100, and 1
were then utilized to multiply each individual's raw
score on each of the indicators. A third scale was con-
structed by simply assigning Likert scores of 5, 4, 3, 2,
and 1 to each of the indicators. Those weights were
then used to multiply the raw score of each individual,
and then summed for the five indicators. Finally, a
fourth scale was calculated by assigning a weight of 1
to all of the five indicators and multiplying each indi-
vidual raw score and summing. The correlation between
the original scale and the second scale was .98; be-
tween the original scale and the third, .98; and be-
tween the original scale and the fourth, .89. This
appears to indicate that the weights assigned the vari-
ous indicators have little overall influence on the scale
score. Others have already argued this same point
quite convincingly. See, e.g., Stanley & Wand, Weight-
ing Test Items and Test Item Options: An Overview of
the Analytical and Empirical Literature, 30 EDUCATIONAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS 21 (1970).
For an even more detailed explanation of how prior
criminal involvement was quantified, see J. Scott, An
Examination of the Factors utilized by Parole Boards
in Determining the Severity of Punishment 57-59'
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Sociology, Indiana University, 1972).
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indicators from which a scale was constructed by
item analysis Cronback's Alpha = .621)" The
nine indicators are as follows:
1) Inmate's Overall Progress
2) Inmate's Overall Cooperation
3) Inmate's Overall Attitude
4) Inmate's Participation in Institutional Pro-
grams and/or Clubs (Number)
5) Inmate's Religious Involvement
6) Inmate's Work Reports
7) Inmate's Housing Reports
8) Inmate's Participation in Vocational Train-
ing
9) Inmate's Participation in School Program
Personal-Biographical Factor: age (at time of re-
lease); education (number of years of school com-
pleted at the time of being sentenced to prison);
I.Q. (as determined by the Revised Beta Examina-
tion administered shortly after an inmate's ad-
mittance to prison); marital status (single, sep-
arated, widowed, divorced, or married at the time
of inmate's appearance before the parole board);
race (white and other); residence (resident of state
or not); sex, and socioeconomic status (as meas-
ured by Hollingshead's Occupational Status Scale
on the basis of each inmate's self-reported occupa-
tion).
14
The dependent variable (severity of punish-
ment) was simply the number of months an inmate
was incarcerated.' 5
" See Cronbach, Coefficient Alpha and the" Internal
Structure of Tests, 16 PsYcHoMETRrKA 297 (1951);
Cronbach & Meehe, Construction Validity and Psycho-
logical Tests, 52 PsYcaooOGICAL BULL. 281 (1955).
Alpha was calculated using computer program
TESTAT, which is part of the EDSTAT-V series
developed by Donald J. Veldman. This statistic reflects
the degree of reliability among items of a scale in terms
of overlapping variance. The formula used in comput-
ing alpha is a generalization of the Kuder-Richardson
formula for dichotomous items:
K [K 1
[!T' - uI'
Where K = the number of items in the scale
I = the item
T = the total (or subscale total)
See D. VELDMAN, FORTRAN PROGRAMMING FOR THE
BEHAvIoRAL SCIENCES 173 (1967).
14 An inmate's self-reported occupation was recorded
upon his admission to prison. The order of occupations
was reversed for better conceptual clarity. Therefore,
an occupation scored 5 is the highest, and one scored 1
is the lowest, just the opposite of the way in which
Hollingshead constructed the scale. See, A. HOLLNGS-
HEAD, Two FACTOR INDEX OF SOCIAL POSITION (1965).
'5 This number includes possible jail time served by
an inmate for the same offense either before trial or
FITDINGS
LEGAL FACTOR
Seriousness of Crime: The seriousness of crime
for which inmates were convicted was" the best
indicator of the severity of punishment, both before
and after controlling for other variables (r = .84
and # = .64). As the seriousness of crime increases,
the severity of punishment also rises. The partial
regression coefficient of .31 indicates that a unit
change in the seriousness of crime will be associated
with 0.31 unit changes in the severity of punish-
ment when -the other independent variables are
controlled. This means that each month of an
inmate's minimum sentence extends the number
of months he will actually be incarcerated by ap-
proximately one-third month when other variables
are controlled. Parole board members appear to
believe that an inmate is not ready for parole until
he has suffered commensurately for the crime he
has committed.
Prior Criminal Involvement: The data from in-
-mates' records indicate that there is only a very
weak relationship between prior criminal record
and severity of punishment (r = -. 02 and 0 =
-. 06). The coefficients do indicate that when all
other variables are taken into consideration, in-
mates with more extensive criminal involvement
are actually punished less, although the relation
ship is extremely weak and only statistically sig-
nificant when all variables are controlled. This is
rather surprising inasmuch as the most useful
guide to prediction of parole violation behavior is
past criminal behavior.1 6 It is also very doubtful
sentencing, if so recorded in the summary report. The
Midwestern state in which these parole boards were
studied had the policy of counting time served in jail
on the same offense in determining when the inmate
was eligible for a parole hearing.
16 See, e.g., BRUCE, BURGEss & HARow, THE WoRK-
ING OF THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW AND THE
PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS 205-49 (1928); D. GLASER,
THE EFFECnVNESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYsTEM
(1964); S. GLUECK & E. GLwEcx, 500 CRIMINAL
CAREERS (1930); D. GOTTFREDSON & K. BALLAD, JR.,
THE VALIDITY or Two PAROLE PREDIcTION SCALEs:
AN EIGHT YEAR FOLLow-uP STUDY (1967); H. MAN-
HEIM & T. WILKINS, PREDICTION METHODS IN RELA-
TION TO BORSTAL TRAINING (1955); L. OnLIN, -SELEc-
TION FOR PAROLE: A MANUAL OF PAROLE PREDICTION
(1951); R. SCm DT, EIN BERRAG ZUM PROBLEM DER
RUCEFALLsPROGNOSE (1936); H. TRUNK, SOCIALE
PROGNOSEN SRAFGEFANGENEN (1937); Cadwell. Pre-
view of a New Type of Probation Study Mode in Alabama,
15 FED. PROBATION 1 (1951); Gottfredson, Assessment
and Prediction Methods in Crime and Delinquency,
TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY,
APPENDIX K, PRESIDENT'S ComMIssIoN ON LAW EN-
JOSEPH E. SCOTT
TABLE I
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR TWELVE VARIABLES IN RELATION TO SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT
Dependent Variable




Seriousness of Crime .84* .71* .31* .64* 359
Prior Criminal Involvement - .02 .00 - .02 - .06* 359
Institutional factory
Disciplinary Reports .24* .06* 3.37* .18* 338
Institutional Adjustment -. 10 .01 .33 .05 175
Socio-biographical factor,
Age .59* .35* 1.58* .31* 354
Education -. 27* .07* -. 04 .00 357
I.Q. -. 16* .03* -. 10 -. 02 321
Marital Status .03 .00 7.15* .08* 357
Race .13 .02 -. 54 .00 359
Residence .02 .00 .24 .00 359
Sex -. 16* .03* -33.91* -. 17* 359
Socioeconomic Status - .01 .00 -5.85* -. 10* 359
* Significant at or beyond the .05 level of probability.
d Dichotomously coded:
w Multiple Correlation Coefficient all Independent Variables:
x Multiple Correlation Coefficient Legal Factor:
y Multiple Correlation Coefficient Institutional Factor:






that prior criminal involvement affected the legal
seriousness of the crime (minimum sentence), inas-
much as 97 per cent of the inmates were serving
indefinite sentences, i.e., the judge simply imposed
the minimum and maximum penalties as pre-
scribed by law for the particular offense. The other
3 per cent of the inmates were serving definite
sentences (certain offenses required the judge to
impose a definite sentence at the dispositional
hearing).
Inasmuch as 100 to 150 parole hearings are often
held in the course of a typical day (five or six
hours of parole board hearing time), much of the
information available to the parole board is seldom
used. The inmate's prior criminal record is one
such item that appears to be used very little in the
decision-making process.
The inverse relationship between prior criminal
involvement and severity of punishment can also
be partially explained by the policy of paroling
FORCEMSENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1967);
Tibbitts, Success and Failure on Parole Can Be Pre-
dicted, 22 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 11 (1931).
inmates early who have detainers filed against
them. Such inmates often have more extensive
records than their counterparts, thus accounting
for the spurious inverse relationship between prior
criminal involvement and severity of punishment.
The author's field observation revealed that if
a parole board member called to the attention of
other board members that the inmate whose case
was being considered had a lengthy record, the
inmate might well be denied parole on that ground.
On the other hand, if a parole board member indi-
cated the inmate had a detainer filed against him,
the fact that he had a lengthy record, even if
noticed, was generally considered irrelevant, and
a parole to the detainer was usually granted. An
example of the latter case is given below:
The inmate, a former resident of New York, had
been sentenced to serve ten to twenty-five years in
prison. This thirty-seven year old inmate had re-
cently been granted clemency and had his mini-
mum reduced to three years which was the exact
amount of time he had served. He had a long crim-
[Vol. 65
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inal record, thirty-two previous arrests (eighteen
for felonies), and this was his third time in prison.
He admitted committing forty-three armed rob-
beries in a three month period prior to this ar-
rest, conviction, and incarceration. Seven of these
robberies were committed in -(state) and,
before being arrested, he had been in a gun battle
with the police, seriously wounding an officer. New
York and Wisconsin both had filed detainers
against him for armed robberies he had admitted
committing prior to his arrest in -(state).
He had received seven disciplinary reports in the
three years he had been incarcerated and had twice
attempted to escape from prison. The board voted
to parole and discharge him to either one of the
detainers.
In the case illustrated above, the researcher in-
quired as to the possibility of the inmate "beating"
the armed robbery charges, now three or four
years old, for which the inmate had not yet been
tried. A member of the board responded: "Oh, well,
he'll be their problem then and not ours. There's
no need for us to keep paying his room and board
if New York or Wisconsin will."
INSTITUTIONAL FACTOR
Disciplinary Reports: The number of disciplinary
reports an inmate received was directly related to
the severity of punishment (r = .24). Those in-
mates receiving the most disciplinary reports were
incarcerated the longest, even when the legal
seriousness of the crime and all other independent
variables were controlled (8 = .18). Disciplinary
reports have a much stronger relationship with the
severity of punishment than does an inmate's
institutional adjustment 7 The number of dis-
ciplinary reports an individual has received is
already quantified for the parole board members'
use, so that the condensed and more readily com-
prehendable information on disciplinary reports is
more often relied upon for information concerning
an inmate's "rehabilitation" than is his institu-
tional adjustment. Parole board members also
assume that inmates who receive disciplinary re-
ports in prison are much more likely to get into
trouble on the outside, and thus need more time
to prepare for release. The partial regression co-
efficient (b = 3.37) indicates that where two in-
mates are similar in all relevant characteristics
17 This statement is based on the standardized regres-
sion coefficients for the two variables, controlling for all
other independent variables. The Beta for disciplinary
reports was .18, while the Beta for institutional ad-
justment was only .05.
(legal, institutional and social-biographical), save
for the fact that one had one more disciplinary
report than the other, the punishment of the in-
mate having one more disciplinary report would
predictably be nearly three and one-half months
longer.
Institutional Adjustment: The data indicate that
inmates who have good institutional adjustment
receive more severe punishment than those with
poor adjustment when the legal seriousness of the
crime and all other independent variables are con-
trolled (fl = .05). This relationship, while not
statistically significant, is nevertheless rather sur-
prising.
Even more surprising is the author's observation
that inmates who are denied parole are often en-
couraged by parole board members to join institu-
tional programs in order to attempt to better
themselves. In fact, in interviews with the five
members of one parole board, three indicated that
an inmate's institutional adjustment was the next
most important factor (after the seriousness of the
crime) in determining whether parole should be
granted. Despite such beliefs, the very manner in
which decisions are made may explain why parole
board members accept the ability of an inmate to
avoid disciplinary reports as the best indicator of
institutional behavior.
Because of the extensive workload, the parole
boards generally spend very little time per case.
In an effort to adequately gauge the decision time
spent per case, the author spent one day recording
the amount of time the board spent discussing or
examining material before reaching a decision on
each case. The medium time per case was eight
seconds.18 The time allocated to decision-making
perhaps gives some indication why variables such
as an inmate's institutional adjustment and prior
criminal record, both of which are not quantified
and which, therefore, require some time and effort
to assess, have little effect on the predicted severity
of punishment.
SociAL-BIOGRAPHICAL FACTOR
Age: The parole board punishes older offenders
more severely than younger offenders (r = .59
18 Parole board members are to have read and taken
notes on the cases before the hearing. Thus, the eight
seconds is hopefully not representative of the time
devoted to each case. It does perhaps indicate that
when there is disagreement, the most readily available
information will be used to expedite the procedure. The
range for this day was from zero to fifty-five minutes.
19741
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and # = .31). The partial regression coefficient
indicates that where two inmates are alike in all
characteristics considered except that one is ten
years older than the other, the punishment of the
older inmate will be approximately sixteen months
longer (10 X 1.58). Parole board members often
viewed young offenders as being immature and as
simply having made a mistake. Older offenders
were generally assumed to have more control over
their behavior, and, consequently, to require more
extensive treatment (punishment) before being
released. 9
Education: Inmates who had completed more
schooling were granted parole earlier than those
with less education (r = -. 27). For example,
inmates with six years or less schooling received
on the average seventy-nine months punishment,
while those with thirteen years or more schooling
averaged only sixteen months punishment. Parole
board members often counseled inmates that
".... someone with your education should be able
to make a good living and stay out of trouble."
However, statistical analysis showed that varia-
tion in education had an insignificant effect on
predicted severity of' punishment when other
variables were controlled (3 = .00).
Intelligence Quotient: Inmates with higher I.Q.'s
were granted parole sooner than those with lower
I.Q.'s (r = -. 16). Offenders with I.Q.'s between
53-89 received on the average fifty-nine months of
incarceration. Those with I.Q.'s between 90-109
averaged forty-six months of incarceration. Those
with I.Q.'s above 110 averaged only thirty-three
months of incarceration. Again, the parole board
indicated many times that an inmate with an I.Q.
"that high" should be able to stay out of trouble.
However, when other variables are controlled, the
relationship between I.Q. and punishment is sta-
tistically insignificant (/3 = -. 02).
Marital Status: Inmates who were married were
granted parole sooner than those with broken
19 This finding was completely unexpected, not only
in light of conflict theory predictions, but perhaps even
more so because of the consistent finding that younger
offenders are more likely to recidivate than older
offenders. See D. GLASER & V. O'LEARY, PERSONAL
CacRAcERSTIcs AND PAROLE OuTcowE (1966);
England, A Study of Post-Probation Recidivism Among
Five Hundred Federal Offenders, 19 FED. PROBATION
11 (1965). Glaser and O'Leary argue that perhaps the
most established piece of statistical knowledge about
criminals is that the older a man is when released from
prison, the less likely he is to be rearrested. Assuming
tat the likelihood of rearrest is a crucial consideration
in parole decisions, the relationship found in this re-
search is rather surprising.
marital ties. The latter, in turn, were paroled
sooner than were single inmates. 20 This relation-
ship was statistically significant after controlling
for the seriousness of the crime and all other in-
dependent variables (3 = .08). The parole board
often indicated that marital ties could be con-
sidered a stabilizing factor in helping a man stay
out of prison, because those with marital ties could
be expected to receive more support when released.
The partial regression coefficient indicates that
where two inmates are alike in all characteristics
considered except that one is married and one is
single, the punishment of the single inmate will be
approximately fourteen months longer (2 X 7.15
- 14.3 months).
Race: The initial analysis of the data gathered
from the summary reports indicated that blacks
were punished more severely than whites (r =
.13). Blacks averaged sixty months of punish-
ment, compared to forty-three months for whites.
However, when the seriousness of the crirae and
other independent variables are controlled, this
relationship is reversed (with whites receiving
slightly, although not statistically, significantly
more severe punishment than non-whites). The
partial regression coefficient (b = -. 54) indicates
whites are punished approximately one-half month
more on the average than are blacks.
There are a number of possible explanations for
this most unexpected finding concerning punish-
ment and race. First, the presence of a black on
each of the parole boards may have inhibited the
white members from discriminating against blacks
in granting paroles. A second possible explanation
is that members of the majority group tolerate
nonconformity by members of a minority as long
as such nonconformity is primarily limited to the
victimization of other minority group members. A
third plausible explanation is that race is simply
not a consideration in the parole board's decision-
making. Still another possible explanation is that
black inmates derive power from the growth of
powerful civil rights groups, as well as receiving
other organized political support unavailable to
white inmates. Most important, however, is simply
the fact that blacks are not being discriminated
against by parole boards in their decision-making. 1
11 Two sets of dummy variables were used to calcu-
late the partial regression coefficient for marital status.
21 Other researchers have recently found other social
control agencies which also do not discriminate on the
basis of race in their handling of offenders. See A.
Reiss, Police Brutality--Answers to Key Questions, in
THE AMBIVALENT FORCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
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Residence: Although nonresidents were found to
be punished more severely than residents of the
state, the relationship was not statistically sig-
nificant (r = .02), and when other independent
variables are controlled, it completely vanishes
(0 = .00). This relationship would probably have
been significant and certainly much stronger if
comparisons had been made exclusively for res-
idents and nonresidents not being paroled to
detainer. Inmates who had detainers filed against
them were generally paroled early and discharged
to the detainer, which absolves the paroling state
from any parole supervision responsibility. In-
mates who had detainers filed against them were
most often nonresidents. Nonresidents who had
not had a detainer filed against them were gen-
erally released later than residents. Parole board
members expressed the opinion that nonresidents,
if paroled to another state, were more expensive
to return to prison if they did violate parole, and,
if paroled within the state (incarcerated in), were
more likely to abscond from parole. Thus, the
apparent policy was to hold nonresidents in prison
longer (unless they had a detainer filed against
them), until they were "better prepared" for
release, than was generally required for resident
inmates.
Sex: Women are punished much less severely
than are men (r = -. 16 and fl = -. 17). Women
on the average were punished eighteen months,
compared to fifty-one months for men. The partial
regression coefficient (b = -33.91) indicates that
when controlling for all other independent var-
iables, the predicted severity of punishment for
women would be thirty-four months less than for
men.
It appears that a basic part of American ideology
is that females should receive more consideration
by legal norm enforcers than males. Prior research
has indicated that females receive more lenient
treatment than do males at the hands of both the
police and the courts.2
PoLIcE (A. Niederhoffer & A. S. Blumberg eds. 1970);
Green, Sentencing Practices of Criminal Court Judges in
Philadelphia, 22 Am. J. CoRR. 35 (1960). It appears, in
fact, that the majority of research conducted prior to
1960 reports blacks receiving more harsh treatment
than whites, while the majority of research since 1960
reports no significant differences in the handling of
offenders on the basis of race. For a review of this
research, see Scott, supra note 12, at 23-41.
21See Doleschal, The Female Offender: A Guide to
Published Materials, 6 Cann & DELINQUENCY 639
(1970). See also the'entire issue of 8 IssuEs Im Cmm-
NOLOGY 1 (1973), devoted to women, crime and crimi-
Socioeconomic Status: Inmates with higher SES
received more lenient treatment (punishment)
than those with lower SES (r = -. 01). Parole
board members often expressed concern with the
ability of inmates to stay out of trouble when
paroled, and apparently assumed that those who
had better jobs would encounter fewer problems.
Therefore, those who indicated prior experience
with more prestigeful occupations were granted
parole earlier, even when all other independent
variables were controlled (f8 = -. 10). The partial
regression coefficient indicates that when all other
variables are considered, a unit change in SES
(Hollingshead's Scale) will affect the predicted




When the variables categorized as legal, social-
biographical and institutional are treated as sets
and examined with regards to their independent
ability to explain or account for the variation in
punishment, the legal set is by far the most sig-
nificant. The legal set accounts for 70 per cent of
the variation in punishment (R = 0.8386, R 2 =
0.7032). The social-biographical, taken separately,
accounts for approximately 45 per cent of the
variation (R = 0.6735, R 2 = 0.4536). The in-
stitutional set independently accounts for only
8 per cent of that variation (R = 0.2754i R 2
0.0758).23 Only an additional 9 per cent of the
variation in the severity of punishment can be
accounted for when using all eight social-bio-
graphical variables and both institutional variables
after the two legal variables have explained all
the variation they can.
Looking at the variables which comprise each
of the three factors individually, one notes that
very few of the variables are significant in the
direction expected. Of the two variables com-
prising the legal factor, only the legal seriousness
of the crime is statistically significant, as ex-
nology. For a review of numerous earlier empirical
studies, see Scott, supra note 12, at 22, 40.
3 In analyzing data categorized as sets, one simply
takes the entire variation of the dependent variable
(punishment) and allows one set to explain all it can
separately. Then, using the entire variation again, one
allows the next set to explain all it can, etc. Thus, the
percentage of variation explained may be greater than
100 per cent due to the fact that some of the same
variation in the dependent variable is being accounted




pected. Although prior criminal involvement is
also statistically significant when all other var-
iables are controlled, it is in the opposite direction,
as expected (i.e., those with the most extensive
records receiving the least punishment). Only
one of the two variables comprising the institu-
tional factor is also significant (i.e., as the number
of disciplinary reports that an inmate receives goes
up, so does the punishment he receives). An in-
mate's over-all institutional adjustment is re-
lated in the opposite direction, as expected, with
punishment. The data indicate that when all vari-
ables are controlled, those inmates behaving the
best while incarcerated are punished the most.
One finds little support for conflict theory pre-
dictions when examining individually the eight
variables which comprise the socio-biographical
factor. Conflict theory predicts that those with
the least power, and those most unlike rule-makers,
will be sanctioned most severely.2 Only an in-
mate's marital status and socioeconomic status
are related with punishment in a statistically sig-
nificant manner, as conflict theory predicts. Of the
remaining socio-biographical variables, only I.Q.
is related with punishment, as predicted (although
the relationship in this case is not statistically sig-
nificant), when other variables are controlled. Age
and sex are statistically significantly related with
punishment in the direction opposite to that which
conflict theory predicts (i.e., older offenders are
punished more severely as are men). Perhaps the
major point to emphasize is that parole board de-
cision-making appears to be based almost ex-
clusively on one legal criterion, the seriousness of
the crime, rather than on an inmate's institutional
adjustment, or on an inmate's socio-biographical
characteristics.
DISCUSSION
The positivists' ideology that an inmate should
be sentenced to prison until he is rehabilitated,
i.e., "ready" to return to society, would appear
still far removed from realization. Particularly is
this the case in light of the fact that an inmate's
personal social-biographical characteristics are sub-
stantially better predictors of the punishment he
will receive than is his entire institutional adjust-
ment, cooperation, participation or the prison's
overall evaluation of his rehabilitation. Perhaps
what should be seriously questioned at this point
24 For a system of formal propositions developed
around conflict theory and its application to crimi-
nology and criminological research, see Turk, Conflict
and Criminality, 31 Amr. SoCIoLoGIcAL Rnv. 338 (1966).
is the present usefulness of either indefinite sen-
tences and/or of parole boards.
As indicated earlier, the extent of the parole
boards' discretion has apparently increased con-
comitantly with the apparent shift in the ideology
of the criminal justice system from an almost ex-
clusively "retributive" basis to a more "retribu-
tive-reformative" approach. This change in ideol-
ogy has resulted in more frequent use of the indefi-
nite or indeterminate sentence. The increased
usage of the indefinite or indeterminate type of
sentences by the various states has transferred the
primary responsibility of determining the proper
length of incarceration for each defendant from the
judiciary to the parole board. This broad power was
conferred on the parole board in order to imple-
ment the "reformative" approach to corrections.
The idea was for an agency or board to periodi-
cally review each inmate's case and release him at
the optimum time for him to adjust and function
adequately in society. The theory was that the
judge, schooled in law and not in human behavior,
would not be as well-qualified to determine how
much treatment (punishment) specific inmates
needed. Similarly, it would be difficult to predict
in advance how offenders would respond to the
various treatment programs provided. A solution
to both of these problems was to create parole
boards, composed of citizens trained in under-
standing human behavior, which would determine,
on the basis of the offender's response to institu-
tional treatment, his degree of readiness to return
to society.
The data analyzed from one Midwestern state's
prisons certainly do not demonstrate that parole
boards function in the manner expected. The data
suggest that parole boards base their decisions
basically on one legal criterion-the legal serious-
ness of the crime. The variables which parole
boards might use in determining the offender's
adjustment and improvement while incarcerated
either are not provided for their use, or, if provided,
appear to be utilized very little in determining
when an inmate should be released.
The parole board does not appear to be fulfilling
any function that the courts could not better
handle themselves, with the possible exception ot
keeping inmates imprisoned for shorter periods
than otherwise might be the case. Whether they
are even serving this function is open to question.n
21 See Glaser, Correction of Adult Offenders in the




The innumerable parole board decisions have
lacked judicial safeguards, and in addition, have
not been subject to public scrutiny. Inasmuch as
one of the reasons often given for prison riots is
the poor and unjust parole polices,26 the entire
parole concept should be re-examined at this
time.Y If parole boards are not acting or function-
ing on any basis other than that available for the
judiciary, it seems rather redundant, expensive
and ridiculous simply to append one more agency
making decision with real consequences for indi-
vidual lives.
As was recently pointed out in a policy state-
ment by the National Council on Crime and De-
linquency:
... the prisoner, comparinghis case to that of others
who were granted parole, may see the denial as a
capricious decision. He is often at a loss to under-
stand what he has done wrong or how he can im-
prove his performance. Parole board silence com-
pounds his cynicism and his hostility to authority.
At the very least, unexplained parole denials
obstruct rehabilitation yet they are quite common
in many state and local jurisdictions.28
Given the manner in which parole boards oper-
ate, other alternatives should certainly be con-
sidered for deciding when offenders should be re-
leased. Several have been suggested, including
strict administrative guidelines for parole decision-
26 Address by R. Wilsnack and L. Ohlin, Precondi-
lions for Major Prison Disturbances, presented at the
American Sociological Association annual meeting in
New York, August, 1973. They reported that insta-
bility in correctional administration and the uncer-
tainty it created was often a precondition for a major
prison disturbance. The uncertainty of parole creates
numerous problems and much anxiety for inmates. See
Scott & Franklin, Inmates' Evaluation of the Indetermi-
nate Sentence, J. CoRR. ED. (1970). See also Garson,
The Disruption of Prison Administration: An Investiga-
tion of Alternative Theories of the Relationship Among
Administrators, Reformers, and Involuntary Social
Service Clients, 6 LAW AND SocErY REv. 531 (1972);
Mitford, Kind and Usual Punishment in California,
227 ATL Tre MoNTilY 45 (1971).
27 The courts are already doing this in several areas,
having repudiated the "hands off" doctrine. They are
apparently adopting a "balancing of interest" test, or a
"least restrictive means" test. Behavioral scientists, it
would seem, have an equal responsibility to contribute
to this examination. In fact, in Sostre v. McGinnis,
442 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1971), the court indicated an
unwillingness to interfere any further in prison adminis-
tration because of the dearth of reliable, empirical
studies on the subject of prison procedures.
Parole Decisions: A Policy Statement, 19 CRi
AND D LmQuENcY 137 (1973).
making.29 This would require parole boards to fol-
low strict rules and regulations in making decisions
and possibly grant certain rights to inmates pre-
viously unavailable, e.g., the right to examine
records for their accuracy upon which decisions are
based, or the right to appeal or have the decision
reviewed.0 Others have suggested the utilization
of an independent ombudsman to intervene when
injustices are observed.31 Still another alternative
would be to simply return the punishing power
strictly to the courts. 2 The courts could then de-
termine the punishment a particular offender
should receive, either by returning to the utiliza-
tion of more definite type sentences, or by utilizing
indefinite type sentences with specific rules and
2'See Palmer, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Exer-
cise of Correctional Discretion, presented at the 1973
Annual Meeting of the American Society of Crimi-
nology, New York, November 4, 1973.
10 Several district courts have recently intervened
and imposed procedural safeguards on prison dis-
ciplinary hearings: See Clutchetts v. Procunier, 328 F.
Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F.
Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F.
Supp. 857 (D. R.I. 1970). For an excellent review of
judicial intervention in prison discipline and, in particu-
lar, the impact of the Morris case in Rhode Island, see
Harvard Center For Criminal Justice, Judicial Inter-
vention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. Cims. L.C. & P.S.
200 (1972).
31 See T. FiTzrAp s, THE DEsnIABITY Or A COR-
REcTiowAL Osamusum (1973); Badillo, The Need For
an Ombudsman, 38 Soci,. AcTIoN 24 (1972).
2 See Mueller, Correctional Law: Inmates' Rights:
Legal Criteria, Reforms, and Futures (Columbus, Ohio,
Program for the Study of Crime and Delinquency, 1971:
available in photocopied typescript). See also Mueller,
Punishment, Corrections and the Law, 45 NEBtASKA L.
REv. 58 (1966). It is certainly not illogical for the
judiciary to take the initiative in determining when an
offender should be released. However, it is not to be
expected that the judge who sentenced an offender to
prison is to check on him daily. A viable alternative
would be an institutional judge-one whose court room
and facilities would be located at each penal institution.
This judge would receive complaints by inmates with
respect to anything that should come to judicial atten-
tion. He would be in charge of reviewing writs of habeas
corpus and requests for writs of mandamus which
"flow" from our institutions today. An institutionally
based judge would also handle inmates' civil problems
which require adjudication, such as divorces, or child
custody cases, and he could also perform marriages.
In addition, he would have the authority to review
inmates' sentences, and he could, if necessary, by
judicial order, receive all relevant information con-
cerning each inmate and his institutional adjustment.
Such procedures would, at the very least, provide in-
mates additional legal rights.
The idea of having institutionally based judges is
not new. Several European countries have already
initiated such procedures. Such a plan is a viable
alternative to the present system, which is apparently
not working as expected or as desired. The use of insti-
tutional judges may provide the dignity and the con-
cern our prisons have repeatedly demanded.
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regulations concerning eligibility for release from
prison. This approach would at least provide "due
process" to the releasing procedure, and would
eliminate much of the uncertainty prevalent in
prisons today.
If an inmate's institutional adjustment and de-
velopment are not being used to determine the
amount of punishment he needs, there would be
little justification for the continued use of parole
boards, and, for that matter, the continued utili-
zation of indefinite or indeterminate type sentences.
As Norval Morris recently demanded of various
segments of the. criminal justice system, ".... prac-
tices must cease to rest on surmise and good in-
tentions; they must be based on facts." 11 This is
certainly applicable to parole boards. If they are
not operating as expected, and not fulfilling some
other unsurmised purpose, then their usefulness
must be reconsidered. There is little justification
for a social control agency to simply increase the
13 Morris, Inpediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. Cnz.
L. REv. 627, 638 (1966).
apprehension and uncertainty of offenders, unless
they are providing some legitimate social function.
Research has already indicated that there is
little if any relationship between institutional ad-
justment and reddivism.3 Therefore, the con-
tinued use of parole boards and indefinite type
sentences, on the assumption that parole boards
can better determine than a judge when an inmate
is "ready" for release, appears to be based possibly
on a false assumption at the outset.
Certainly, additional research is needed on
parole board decision-making. If parole boards in
other states are basing their decisions almost ex-
clusively on the legal seriousness of the crime, as
the parole boards are in the Midwestern state
studied, this will certainly be added justification
for seeking other alternatives to utilize in deter-
mining offenders' "proper" length of incarcera-
tion.
3 D. GLAsER, THn E EcTr=E ss oF PRIsoN D
PA oxL SYsTEm 293-98 (1964); S. Miller, Post-Institu-
tional Adjustment of 433 Consecutive TICO Releases,
1971 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Department
of Sociology, Ohio State University).
[Vol. 65
